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ABSTRACT
The hallmark of a successful response to a nuclear detonation will be the resilience of the community, region,
and nation. An incident of this magnitude will rapidly become a national incident; however, the initial critical steps
to reduce lives lost, save the lives that can be saved with the resources available, and understand and apply re-
sources available to a complex and dynamic situation will be the responsibility of the local and regional respond-
ers and planners. Expectations of the public health and health care systems will be met to the extent possible by
coordination, cooperation, and an effort to produce as consistent a response as possible for the victims. Re-
sponders will face extraordinarily stressful situations, and their own physical and psychological health is of great
importance to optimizing the response. This article illustrates through vignettes and supporting text how the in-
cident may unfold for the various components of the health and medical systems and provides additional context
for the discipline-related actions outlined in the state and local planners’ playbook.
(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:S73-S88)
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Historically, detailed civilianmedical planning fornuclear detonation incidents has been limited,in part related to the overwhelming nature of
global thermonuclearwar scenarios.Although thechances
of a nuclear incident involving an improvised nuclear de-
vice are small, the impact on a city and the surrounding
regionwould be catastrophic. Knebel et al1 provide a de-
scriptionof thephysical aftermathandDiCarlo et al2 over-
view casualtymedical care issues. Beyond the severe dam-
age zone and the moderate damage zone, the physical
infrastructure will be mostly intact (see Knebel et al1).
Thus, although the incident is physically catastrophic to
a limited area, preparation and response planning in-
cluding sheltering, evacuation, and medical response in
the affected regioncanhelp save tens of thousands of lives.
The Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) and other agencies have scripted playbooks for
a range of hazards designed to guide federal agency re-
sponse. Based on discussions with local/regional plan-
ners, from participation in various national-level exer-
cises, and from feedback on anumber ofDHHSproducts,
the Scarce Resources for a Nuclear Detonation Project,
in conjunction with the Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary for Preparedness and Response, produced a proto-
type state and local planners’ playbook for medical re-
sponse to a nuclear detonation that local/regional
planners could use as a template for local preparation
and planning, and thus potentially harmonize con-
cepts, plans, and terminology throughout the United
States. This article provides discipline-oriented infor-
mation that sets the context for the recommended ac-
tions in the playbook.3
RESPONSE PRINCIPLES
Resiliency of medical care networks is critical to suc-
cessful response.4,5 Priorities common to all-hazards re-
sponse during the first hours to days include appropri-
ate notifications, mobilization of available resources,
implementation of incident command systems, infor-
mation gathering to obtain situational awareness, and
multiagency coordination. Key features that will affect
response that are presented in other manuscripts in-
clude the following:
• Sheltering in place and efficient dissemination of ac-
curate, essential information regarding evacuation and
availability of medical assistance are extremely im-
portant.6
• Concomitant trauma, burn, and radiation injuries in
the severe damage zone result in few survivors.2
• Many injured individuals will have no radiation ex-
posure or contamination andmany fallout victimswill
have little or no physical trauma.2,6,7
• Radiation levels decay rapidly,making perimeters and
exposures dynamic for medical care, search and res-
cue, and evacuation.6
The initial blast will produce traumatic injury, includ-
ing secondary injury frombuilding collapse, broken glass,
automobile accidents (as many as 30 000 in computer
models from flash blindness and other causes).1,6,7 The
initial influx of victims will likely be from trauma and
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burns. Radiation casualties will occur from the initial detona-
tion (prompt radiation) often combined with traumatic injury
and many radiation-only injuries from fallout. Fallout decays
rapidly, so most of the severe radiation exposure will be in the
first few hours. Including time spent sheltering and for trans-
portation, it is anticipated that the radiation victims will be-
gin reaching emergency departments (EDs) within the first 12
hours as they self-evacuate. Because of their location, staff at
some health care facilities may see almost exclusively trau-
matic injuries, burns, or fallout-related illness. Depending on
the nature of the facility, theymay be ill prepared for the burns,
trauma, or types of patients—for example, injuries and expo-
sures affecting children and/or their caregivers will place par-
ticular stress on medical response facilities that do not nor-
mally provide pediatric emergency services.
Triage and Initial Trauma Care
Although triage concepts are understoodbymost emergency phy-
sicians8 and practiced in limited scope at times when operative
or diagnostic imaging priorities betweenpatients need to bemade,
it is rare for physicians to face significant resource triage deci-
sions9-11 orhundreds of patients presentingperhour for care.12 Lim-
ited guidance is available for catastrophic situations.11,13,14
The degree of resource triage thatwill be exercised after a nuclear
detonation is far different from any previous disaster in the
United States. Typical mass casualty prioritization to operat-
ing rooms or computed tomography scans, in general, will be
abandoned, with ratios at some hospitals of more than 1000 ca-
sualties presenting per operating room available. Providersmust
be trained in such events to avoid “doing what we usually do,
only faster”15 and make conscious decisions to direct resources
more broadly to salvageable casualties.10,16 The benefit in al-
ready having triage guidelines in place is obvious.
Hospitals within 100 to 200 mi (one-half to a full tank of gas,
roughly) canexpect to receive self-referredcasualties in theearly
aftermath of the incident, although not in as large volume as
facilities who are close to ground zero.Within 24 to 72 hours of
detonation, it is likely that proximalmedical facilitieswill be re-
source, space, and personnel depleted, resulting in greater mi-
gration of injured, exposed, and/or highly anxious individuals
intomoredistant locations beyondground zero.Theexperience
will likely parallel the aftermath of hurricanes, inwhich a disas-
ter displaces a large population and destroys infrastructure.11,17
This will be an exceedingly dynamic situation. At all of the re-
ceiving hospitals, there may be varying degrees of triage of re-
sources based on demand.
Decision making and triage for an individual will depend on
the following:
• Medical condition and prognosis (initially assuming that the
best care is available and then considering what the out-
come will be in the scarce-resources environment, because
both estimates will be important)
• Amount of resources needed to achieve the best possible
outcome
• Degree of resources imbalance at the place and time that the
decisions are made
• Ability to anticipate supply and demand changes—the situ-
ation may get better for an individual as time passes
• Patient’s initial response to stabilization
• Victim reevaluation as the resources situation changes
Although complex, these decisionswill have to bemade quickly,
in a chaotic environment, and with limited supporting data or
diagnostics. Surgery and emergencymedicine staff are likely best
equipped to make triage decisions in these situations so that
select patients can be prioritized for available interventions.18
For medical decision making and triage, it is necessary to have
an understanding of survivability of various categories of in-
jury, including a single injury of burn, blast, radiation, and com-
bined injury, as discussed by DiCarlo et al elsewhere in this spe-
cial issue ofDisaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness.2 It
should be noted that special populations such as pediatrics may
require significantly different assessment and treatment as com-
pared with the usual adult population.
Rapid assessment of patients for severe bleeding and possible pen-
etrating truncal injury19 is critical, because these must be ad-
dressed in the hospital environment. Patients should bemet out-
side the facility or in lobby areas and those with minor injuries
directed away from the facility to other hospitals, clinics, desig-
nated adjacent buildings, or to await medical care or assembly
center opening (see Knebel et al1 and DiCarlo et al2). Transpor-
tation will require improvisation, including buses and self-
transportation. Figure 1 outlines a potential approach to triaging
patients presenting to hospitals after a nuclear detonation.
Based on military experience, aggressive hemorrhage control is
the single most beneficial medical intervention in basic trauma
care,20,21 and control of major external hemorrhage should be a
focus in the triage area. This type of controlmay require pressure
dressings or even use of arterial tourniquets in some cases (tour-
niquets are not commonly used in ED settings, but can be easily
fashioned).Nonclinical staff, “thewalkingwounded,”andpatients
themselves can assist with direct pressure hemorrhage control to
freeupclinical staff forcontinuedtriage. Internalhemorrhagecon-
trol and targetedprocedures,whichprovide themaximalpatient
benefit for the minimum time and resource investment (such
as needle thoracostomy or chest tubes for isolated pneumo/
hemothorax, for example), should be prioritized next.
The medical response unfolds in stages (the playbook3 is also
organized in this way):
1. Preincident: Preparation (possibly some ramp-up based
on intelligence)
2. Phase I: Early phase: 0 to 24 hours
3. Phase II: Intermediate phase: 24 to 96 hours (in addition
to ongoing 24 hours)
4. Phase III: Later phase:96 hours
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The recovery phase, which begins early in the incident as dis-
placed people and damaged infrastructure are addressed, causes
enormous disruption that may last for many years. Recovery is
not a subject of the Scarce Resources for a Nuclear Detona-
tion Project and is discussed only briefly.
The following topics are presented by function and sector, in-
cluding vignettes to illustrate how early event actions may un-
fold: emergency medical services (EMS), initial health care fa-
cility response, public health, medical system response, evacuee
medical care and fallout-related radiation illness, and recovery.
Emergency Medical Services
Initial EMS Actions
Recognition that a nuclear detonation has occurred may be de-
layed because weather conditions canmask the brilliant flash of
light andmushroom-shaped cloud. The availability of radiation
detectors for vehicles, facilities, and individualswill expedite de-
fining the incident and organizing the response. The 4 physical
zones of response are described byKnebel and colleagues1 and in
Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation.6 The in-
cident commander (IC)22 andEMSwill play a critical role in de-
termining radiation triage, treatment, and transport (RTR) sites,
some of which will form spontaneously during an incident (see
Knebel et al1 andColemanetal7 fordetails).Public safetyanswer-
ing points (911 centers) will be overwhelmed immediately, and
contingency plans for public communicationwill helpminimize
panic.Theseplanswillincludeinformationregardingshelter,evacu-
ationandassemblypoints, personaldecontamination, andavoid-
ance ofmedical facilities by people who are not seriously injured
orlocatedwithinthedangerousfalloutzone.1Coordinationofcom-
munication requires careful planningandexecution toensure in-
teroperability and functionality of both the systems and themes-
sage for the public.
FIGURE 1
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Hospital triage: assumes hospital resources are inadequate for demand but not overwhelmed. As physical radiation exposure information becomes available hours after the event,
people may be triaged to not needing radiation assessment if they are not in radiation zones. Physical radiation exposure may also be used to estimate combined injury victims, although
confirmatory laboratory data may be needed. Absolute lymphocyte count interpretation available on the Radiation Emergency Medical Management Web site.36 Temporizing care for
severely injured victims may be palliative care only.
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In addition to the usual precautions relating to physical haz-
ards, safety of EMS personnel in a nuclear detonation requires
appropriate use of radiation detectors and guidance as to radia-
tion exposure limits, preferably determined before an inci-
dent. Although the ICwill make the decisions, in general, lim-
its of 5 rem (Roentgen equivalent man) annual total dose have
been recommended for industrial radiation workers and up to
25 rem for lifesaving activities.23 (These levels are based on the
delayed lifetime increased risk for cancer, which is about 0.05%/
rem.24) Exposures25 remmay be justified in isolated circum-
stances if it would save many lives, with the proper consent of
the responder. Itmust be remembered that these are annual lim-
its, so once certain doses are reached further activity in a ra-
diation zone may be precluded or severely limited.
Initial EMS response follows usual incident response/mass ca-
sualty incident principles, although the incident scope will re-
quire significant plan flexibility, using physical approaches that
avoid or limit radiation exposure. Access roads will require both
debris clearance and law enforcement security to maintain or-
der and flow of emergency supplies. Many of the initial casu-
alties encountered, particularly from the light damage zone, will
have little or no radiation exposure, and somewhat later, ca-
sualties from the dangerous fallout zones will have radiation ex-
posure with little or no injury. EMS will guide or direct many
victims to assembly centers or medical facilities as defined in
the RTR system.1,3 Hospitals within walking distance (2-5 mi)
of the incident will be completely overwhelmed with self-
referred casualties and should be bypassed by EMS if other hos-
pitals provide equivalent service and can be accessed.12,25
Triage follows usual trauma triage principles in the immediate af-
termath of a detonation. EMSagenciesmay use simple triage and
rapid treatment (more commonly known as START), sort, as-
sess, lifesaving interventions, triage, and/or transport (more com-
monly known as SALT), or other accepted triagemethods,19,26-28
but they should incorporate a search for truncal-penetrating in-
juries, because these can appear benign but may represent severe
internal injuries.18,19 Radiation triagewill incorporate physical lo-
cation of victim and onset time and severity of subsequent symp-
toms. EMSpersonnel should be cautious in performing radiation-
exposure triage by symptoms because vomiting29 andneurological
symptoms are not specific to radiation injury and may represent
traumatic or psychological causes. In addition, specific training,
information, andmedical countermeasures pertaining to the dif-
ferent needs of pediatric victims after a radiation incident must
be available to EMS personnel. These should include plans for
the stabilization, treatment, and transport of childrenwithout the
explicit consent of caregivers, who may be incapacitated, de-
ceased, or otherwise unavailable. EMS services should plan for
situations in which both adult and pediatric members of a family
are injured and attempt to minimize separation by transport to a
single facility. Pediatric hospitals should, therefore, be prepared
to accept adult casualties and the more commonly planned re-
verse situation.
Ambulatory victimswhohave fallout on them ideally should per-
formdry decontamination,which is removing outer garments and
dustingoff exposed areas suchas thehair.Medical triage and trans-
EMS Response Box 1: Key Principles for EMS
Response to a Nuclear Detonation
• The safety of EMS providers is paramount, including provid-
ing protective gear and radiation exposure determination and
control measures.
• Radiation levels increase rapidly (greater than linearly)
closer to the scene and fall off rapidly outside the severe dam-
age (total structural collapse) zone.
• Radiation exposure rates are critical to establishing location
of triage/casualty collection points (recognizing rapid decay
may allow movement of these sites over time).
• Search and rescue of patients in higher radiation/damage ar-
eas is a low priority.
• Efforts should focus on people with moderate injuries in areas
from the blast upwind or with minimal fallout.
• EMS uses usual trauma triage guidelines during the initial re-
sponse phase.
• EMS personnel can maximize lives saved in the early after-
math of the event by providing hemorrhage control and tri-
aging victims to available transportation to health care facili-
ties or other patient-collection areas.
• Assistance in making victims ambulatory or ability to be
helped by a “buddy system” may save many lives (eg, splint-
ing, superficial wound bandaging) and allow self-evacuation.
• In the face of rapidly changing conditions, the triage category
for a victim may improve as resources arrive. Thus, serial vic-
tim evaluation is important.
EMS Response Box 2: Day 1
Ron Jin was a paramedic staffingMedic 1 when the blast occurred.
Available EMS units were directed to 2 areas on the north side of
the blast zone for staging at the request of the initial units on scene.
The initial EMS units had to stop far from the apparent source of
the blast because of significant glass and debris in the road. They
were overwhelmed there by ambulatory casualties with glass and
shrapnel-type injuries. Jin and other arriving EMS personnel ad-
vanced further into the area with fire personnel who were carrying
dosimeters (each captain had a digital alarm dosimeter). A casu-
alty collection point was established at a 5-rem/hour threshold by
Jin and his colleagues, while fire personnel conducted brief “hasty
searches” in damaged structures in lower radiation areas. The col-
lection point was soon overwhelmed by “the walking wounded.”
Firefighters volunteered to search zones of higher radiation, but they
were advised by their battalion chief to concentrate on the large
numbers of moderately injured patients. Jin acted as the triage of-
ficer at the casualty collection point, directing bystanders and pub-
lic safety personnel to ferry/walk casualties to the vehicle staging
area for transport. Ambulatory victims were asked to walk to buses
that were unable to approach closely because of debris. Those with
minor injuries were encouraged to assist each other inmaking it to
the vehicle staging area. Additional treatment supplies and nar-
cotic analgesics arrived later as part of the preplanned EMS disas-
ter supplies. After 45 minutes, Jin rotated his responsibility as tri-
age officer to another EMS provider and accompanied a critical
patient in the ambulance to Sacred Heart Hospital.
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portation to safer areas should take high priority. A “buddy sys-
tem” approachof victimshelping victimswill free upmedical per-
sonnel.Overtriagemust be avoided to ensure that limitedhospital
resources can focus on the most salvageable victims (generally
people who are moderately wounded).30,31
Subsequent EMS Actions
Although search and rescue for entrapped victims may be on-
going after the first few hours, the Incident Commander (IC)
will make decisions about staff and resource allocation, em-
phasizing those areas where EMS providers can use their skills
to make the largest difference for the largest number of injured
people. EMSmay develop (or receive frompublic health sources)
triage criteria to classify injured and fallout victims as expect-
ant, and if this is the case, appropriate policies and procedures
can ensure that patients receive what palliative care is avail-
able. (Further detail is provided byMurrain-Hill et al3 andCole-
man et al32). The goal of helping the most people as possible
includes both saving lives and providing comfort. The IC will
request and incorporate outside agency resources (eg, ground,
rotor-wing, fixed-wing) and anticipate the need for resources
for future missions (eg, providing medical support on evacua-
tion planes/buses/trains) to optimize the care of victims in the
intermediate and delayed triage categories.
EMS personnel—indeed all personnel involved in responding
to the incident—will have significant mental and behavioral
health needs and issues, including the need to contact/locate
family members, potential need for housing, and other assis-
tance. Resources, rest, food, and resiliency information will be
needed as soon as possible. Risk communication, consistent and
timely information, and rumor control are as important for EMS
personnel as they are for the public, because misinformation
about contamination, exposure thresholds, and other issues will
affect EMS staff and their ability to fulfill their job duties. (Men-
tal health impact and management are discussed by Dodgen et
al elsewhere in this issue of the journal.33)
Initial Health Care Facility Response
Hospital Impact and General Response
Based on estimates of casualties,1 overwhelming numbers of pa-
tients can be expected at the closest hospitals within the hour
after the incident. The missions for these hospitals in the first
hours are 3-fold:
1. Fully activate emergency response plans, including fer-
rying of needed resources to the facility (Hospital IncidentCom-
mand System).34
2. Triage less severely injured patients to other facilities or
waiting areas.
3. Provide stabilizing, not definitive care, to the largest num-
ber of patients possible given the resources and staff available.
With emergency plans activated, health care facilities will at-
tempt to liaison with overall IC and with other area facilities
and gain situational awareness, while providing either stabiliz-
ing or definitive care, depending on the demand and available
resources. Hospitals located further from the detonation may
be asked to provide staff or resources tomore overwhelmed hos-
pitals or accept initially stabilized or patients with minor inju-
ries in transfer from these facilities. Under these circum-
stances, personnel and supplies will need to be deployed and
used carefully under an effective IC system so that functional-
ity of these distal medical facilities is preserved.
Radiologic Injury and Decontamination
Assessment of degree of contamination and degree of radio-
logic injury is not an initial management priority for hospital
personnel when life-and-limb–threatening trauma is present.
Once the traumatic threats to life have been addressed, an as-
sessment of the patient’s scope of radiation injury should be un-
dertaken to establish priority for cytokine treatment and fur-
ther testing.
Hospitals located close to the blast that are overrun with victims
should expect that some radioactive contamination of the facil-
itywill occur. Containment of radiologic contamination, includ-
ing clothing control (including shoes) and self-decontamina-
tion (patients undressing andbagging their ownclothing), should
Health Care Facility Response Box 1: Key Principles
for Initial Response
• The event will look very different to individual hospitals de-
pending on their location in relation to the event and to the
time after the event.
• The initial triage of patients should follow usual trauma pri-
orities until symptoms, patient location relative to fallout,
and laboratory testing allow for the assessment of severity of
radiation injury.
• Radiation victim triage cannot be based on the presence of
vomiting alone.
• The majority of early injuries presenting to the hospital will
consist of penetrating and laceration injuries from glass and
shrapnel.
• Containment of radioactive contamination on clothing is
optimal (eg, provision of dry decontamination). Wet decon-
tamination should not be a priority for facilities with large
numbers of patients presenting for care. A cold outside tem-
perature and a lack of exchange clothing may be a contra-
indication for wet decontamination. Many patients will have
no radiation exposure.
• Radiation burns are not a dominant injury pattern after a
ground-level detonation. They are a concern from an air
burst detonation, and secondary fires may produce thermal
burns.
• Hemorrhage control and damage control surgery for patients
with isolated penetrating injuries are likely to be the best in-
vestment of resources to improve the most patient outcomes.
At the hospitals located closest to the scene, intensive inter-
ventions such as surgery must be forgone to devote staff at-
tention to external bleeding control and wound care.
• Alternate care locations for less-severe shrapnel/glass injuries
(and later mild/moderate radiation illness) will be required.
Facility and community plans should incorporate such cen-
ters. Some triage and alternate treatment sites may become
interim assembly centers.
Health Care System Planning and Response
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be a priority at all times. These efforts alone can decrease a per-
son’s contamination by90%.6 Many trauma victims may have
no radiation exposure, and even fallout-exposedvictimsmayhave
no contamination on them.6,35 Doorway portalmonitors or hand-
heldmonitors can help respondersmake rapid, qualitative assess-
mentsof contaminationanddirectdecontamination/clothingcon-
trol efforts. Radiologic contamination on feet is the most likely
source of spread within the facility once clothing is controlled.
As the resource situation allows, more formal patient radiation
surveying anddecontamination that is consistentwith usual prac-
tices should be undertaken.35-37 Those that cannot perform self-
decontamination (eg, children, people with functional or physi-
cal impairments) should be assisted and escorted.
Protection of health care providers includes the usual barrier,
mask, and glove precautions and appropriate types of dosim-
eter badges, whichmay include alarming electronic readout do-
simeters for those with initial patient contact and routine ra-
diation badges for others.
As resources allow, victims suspected of having been irradi-
ated and hospitalized patients who cannot provide location/
exposure history that can be correlated with risk of radiation
exposure should have an absolute lymphocyte count (ALC) per-
formed 12 hours after the exposure. This screening will al-
low at least some categorization of exposure and prognosis and
guide further decisions about care. If possible, a repeat ALC af-
ter 12 to 24 additional hours can more precisely define risk of
complications and death. The Radiation Emergency Medical
Management Web site36 provides dose-estimation calculators.
Patient prioritization by surgical, emergency, and critical care
staff for interventions and/or transfer will be based on avail-
able resources.18,38 Movement of a limited number of tempo-
rized patients to other facilities via ground or air transporta-
tion within the first 1 to 2 days after detonation is resource
intensive, but it may significantly relieve the pressure on in-
tensive care and operating room resources. External transport
agencies may be able to ferry supplies into the hospital and re-
turn patients to other regional facilities.
Using patient exposure history and ALC (if available), vic-
tims who are considered high priority for radiation injury treat-
ment should receivemyeloid cytokines (eg, granulocyte colony-
stimulating factor [G-CSF]) as soon as possible and receive their
definitive surgeries within (optimally) a 48- to 72-hour win-
dow after injury, because surgeries delayed beyond that run a
high risk for infection and healing failure as a result of the in-
terval death of the tissue and hematopoietic cells necessary for
surgical recovery and early healing.39,40 After life-and-limb–
saving surgeries are complete, as many orthopedic and other
surgical cases as possible should be completed in the first 48 to
72 hours after the detonation.
Transportation and Tracking
The amount of patient documentation performed according to
the facility disaster plan will likely be much less than during
routine operations. The key elements include a registration log
listing patients seen and their diagnosis, disposition (includ-
ing receiving facility if transferred), and contact information.
Despite best efforts, the hospital may be unable to complete
charting or track victims triaged away from the ED under these
circumstances. Emergency planningmay include details for re-
questing transportation resources from area air and ground EMS
agencies, but also understanding the likely huge demandon these
resources during these incidents.
Unaccompanied Minors and Vulnerable Adults
Children and other select patient groups whose parents or care-
givers are incapacitated or unavailable may require lifesaving
interventions that should be performed expeditiously. To avoid
critical legal or bioethical complications that could paralyze the
response system, relevant protocols should be developed as part
of the planning process long before a disaster strikes. In addi-
tion, protocols for rapid reunification of children with parents
or guardians should be available for activation after a cata-
strophic incident. Hospitals should also have plans in place for
Health Care Facility Response Box 2: Day 1
RoyG.Bivwas the lead emergency physician at SacredHeartHos-
pital, a level 1 trauma center located 4mi from the downtown area.
Hewas eating a doughnut when he heard a loud noise and rumble.
EMS personnel standing on the ambulance drive were temporarily
blinded by the flash of the detonation and unable to see. Based on
the appearance of the cloud rising over downtown, Biv fully acti-
vated the hospital emergency operations plan.Callback pageswere
sent to critical clinical and administrative personnel. Supplies were
brought to the EDper the disaster protocol.An ancillary triage area
was designated in the hospital lobby. The “walking wounded” be-
gan to present within about 15 minutes and were directed to the
lobby and an urgent care center down the street. Within 30 min-
utes, critically injured victims were arriving at the hospital via pri-
vate vehicle and later via EMS. All of the staff was occupied stop-
pingbleeding fromdeep cuts frombrokenglass on themanyvictims.
Adecontamination areawas established in thehospital parking lot,
allowing noncritically injured victims to self-decontaminate by re-
moving clothing and putting on hospital gowns. Patients who did
not require immediate medical attention were excluded from en-
try into the ED and were referred to a nearby church, which is a
preplannedassemblycenter.Operating roomsandcritical care spaces
were opened, but capacitywas quickly overwhelmed. Patients were
placed in hallways on all of the floors of the hospital, awaiting ei-
ther surgery or imaging studies. Surgeonsmade decisions about pri-
ority for operative cases and performed many bailout procedures.
The hospital command center requested area rotor-wing agencies
to help ferry stabilized patients to other area hospitals with capac-
ity for surgical critical care and to bring in additional surgical staff
and equipment (eg, laparotomy trays, suture trays, dressings). Bus
drivers were asked tomove ambulatory patients to community hos-
pitals and reception centers located severalmiles away from thehos-
pital. As the event continued to unfold, information was faxed to
the ED describing the pattern of heavy fallout based on field re-
ports. Surgical staff determined that critically injured patients ex-
tricated fromthese areas presenting fromthe firsthour after theevent
would be initially triaged as expectant.
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situations in which victim medical care is complete, but there
is no caregiver or parent to accept the patient.
Subsequent Hospital Response Issues
Hospitals in the affected region should expect to receive large
numbers of patients presenting with possible fallout radiation
exposure in the days after detonation, including those with psy-
chological effects that mimic radiation toxicity. There is a sig-
nificant potential for these patient loads to dwarf the immedi-
ate postincident presentations, especially if timely sheltering
instructions are not provided or followed. Assessment of these
patients includes evaluation for complications related to vom-
iting and diarrhea. Those without severe symptoms can be dis-
charged home. For patients with a high likelihood of acute ra-
diation syndrome (ARS), hospitals would use existing supplies
of myeloid cytokines for the “first dose” (eg, G-CSF) from avail-
able local stocks or caches and/or refer patients to receive this
treatment where and when available from federal stockpiles.
Triage approaches are described elsewhere in this special issue
by Casagrande et al31 and Coleman and colleagues.32
Treatmentwithmyeloid cytokines for patients who are expected
to survive their radiation exposure and combined traumamay of-
fer significant outcome benefit.2 Because of cost and shelf-life is-
sues,however, fewinstitutions, evenbonemarrowtransplantcen-
ters,maintainmorethanusualuseinventoryorsmallcachesofsuch
medications. The federal StrategicNational Stockpile41 program
maintains inventories of cytokines for radiation disaster contin-
gencies.Thesematerialswouldbedistributed toaffectedareas ac-
cordingtostateandlocalplanningfor receiptofStrategicNational
Stockpile supplies.Health care facilities shouldworkwith public
health authorities before an incident to ensure that this system is
understood and practiced so that there is minimal delay in trans-
porting the medications to the health care facilities. Even if mo-
bilized immediately, therewill be a likelydelayof at least 24hours
until the medications begin to arrive at the facilities for use. Al-
though these medications were stockpiled to address a major ra-
diationevent,demandmaystill exceedsupplyandallocationstrat-
egies may have to be implemented.32
The mental health issues noted in the EMS section are appli-
cable. By 72 hours after the detonation, federal and other health
care providers may be transitioning into the facility to replace
or supplement usual hospital staff. Space considerationswill con-
tinue to be an issue and will require good risk communication
to direct less severely ill people to alternate care sites/assembly
centers. The hospital incident management team will need to
reevaluate their staffing and service priorities and resource needs
each day and work with regional, state, and federal partners to
ensure that the institution can continue to offer emergency and
inpatient services. There may be a significant need for addi-
tional security, traffic control, and other law enforcement as-
sistance; emergency management may have difficulty priori-
tizing health care facilities for scarce law enforcement resources
in the immediate aftermath of an incident. Therefore, table-
top and other preincident exercises are important to establish
the need and the mechanisms to obtain necessary resources.
A staff registry should track those staff involved in the response
and their likely exposure levels. During this phase,more compre-
hensive assessment and some mitigation of the radiologic con-
tamination of the facility can include temporary (eg, use of walk-
offmats—plastic filmor paper rolls used on construction sites—to
prevent tracking through known contamination that cannot eas-
ily be cleaned up, replacement of hospital air filters that trap ra-
dioactive particulate debris) and definitive (eg, cleaning and/or
removing contaminated tile and carpeting) procedures.
Public Health
Initial Public Health Actions
The public health challenges after a nuclear detonation will
be myriad. A few key early actions can make a critical differ-
ence in the number of people injured by fallout and the num-
ber of lives that can be saved by evacuation to other regional
or national population centers where sufficient medical re-
sources are available.As an agency, public healthwill be uniquely
taxed to keep up with not only the situational awareness but
also integration of arriving resources (both requested and un-
requested), informational demands, and response demands.
These activities must be closely coordinated with those of the
medical care sector, emergencymanagement, emergencymedi-
cal services, and public safety to ensure joint objectives and con-
sistency of information to the responders, public, and me-
Public Health Response Box 1: Key Principles
for Public Health Agencies After a Nuclear Detonation
• Sheltering information should be provided to the public as
rapidly as possible in conjunction with emergency manage-
ment using emergency warning/notification/broadcast sys-
tems. Appropriate sheltering from fallout can dramatically re-
duce radiation injury casualties.
• The appropriate time to evacuate the fallout areas should be
determined (in conjunction with emergency management
and federal resources) and this decision communicated
within hours of the initial sheltering order.
• Victims of fallout should be directed to screening sites and
assessed for high-risk exposures based on subjective infor-
mation (eg, location, shelter taken, current symptoms and
signs). Those with higher predicted doses of radiation injury
should ideally receive G-CSF within 1 day postexposure and
be evacuated or directed to other population centers for care.
• Appropriate shelters should be opened to accommodate dis-
placed people; there should be capacity and resources to pro-
vide for children and other vulnerable populations.
• Behavioralhealthand family reunification issueswill bechalleng-
ing in the immediate aftermath and require substantial planning.
• Amass fatalityplan shouldbe implementedandalso thepublic in-
formed that saving lives and providing care to survivorsmust take
priority over body recovery when resources are scarce.
• Effectivevictimtrackingearly intheeventwill facilitate long-term
monitoring.
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dia.42,43 Public healthwill require significant support frompartner
agencies to accomplish these missions; these support roles and
responsibilities should be defined preincident, as follows:
• Conduct preincident education instruction on the need to
duck and cover if amassive flash of light is noted (rather than
go to the window) and immediately take shelter in a similar
manner for a tornado warning after any massive blast in the
community until instructed further.
• Provide rapid information with respect to safety and timing
of leaving initial shelters to escape the proximal blast zone
and/or to receive appropriate medical attention.
• Identify and work with IC on situational awareness of dam-
age and radiation levels and suggested actions for people in
fallout areas.
• Coordinatemodeling information supplied bymultiple agen-
cies (local, state, and federal) with environmental sampling/
reports of actual radiation levels to provide responders and
emergency management with exposure information that is
as accurate as possible. This will be difficult in such a dy-
namic situation. Preincident efforts to identify sources of in-
formation and ensure ameans of reporting/coordinationwith
public health are critical to success after a detonation.







treatment, and referral to appropriate next facility.44
• Open alternate care sites (that may be near assembly centers)




tial, and will increase over time. If palliative care patients are
well enough to travel (many in the latent phase ofARS), then
strong consideration for evacuation should be given.
• Support formasscare(sheltering) forpeoplewhoevacuatedthe
falloutareasandcannotidentifyotherhousing.Petcareandshel-
teringalsomustbeaddressed.48Allcentersandsheltersmusthave
adequate provisions to care for children (accompanied or not
accompanied by parents or guardians) and others with special
needs.
• Provideriskcommunication, includingwhento(andwhennot
to) seek medical care,49 and frequent and timely incident up-
dates. Address rumors and misinformation.
Subsequent Public Health Activities
• After the delineation of fallout zones and exposure rates,
such information must be disseminated widely so victims
seeking treatment in other regions can be assessed and
treated appropriately.
• Victims of infrastructure loss such as those who are depen-
dent on medical technologies (eg, home ventilators, oxygen,
dialysis) will require support to ensure that treatments are
continued during evacuation and sheltering.
• Registration and tracking of exposed and evacuated people
will be a daunting process. If a paper-based form is used ini-
tially, then the transfer of this information to electronic me-
dia and creation of a master file will facilitate victim track-
ing during and after the incident; family reunification; and
identification of dead or missing people. Development of in-
tegrated systems that are capable of tracking across state
lines and systems remains a high priority.50 These systems
and protocols will be necessary to ensure rapid reunification
of families that have been displaced or separated.
• Evacuation of salvageable fallout casualties in the latent
phase of their illness to areas of the nation with appropriate
medical capacity will likely begin within the first week after
detonation. Thus, movement of more severely injured, non-
ambulatory patients will be a priority in the first few days af-
ter the incident, and movement of ambulatory (and rela-
tively well, because they are in the latent phase of ARS)
fallout casualties a priority in days 3 through 10 (although
this movement can occur earlier if resources allow).
• As the fallout casualties are evacuated and themedical system
stabilizes from both transfers and an influx of resources, atten-
tioncanbe focusedon themyriad shelterhealth, environmen-
tal health, population monitoring, behavioral health, and at-
risk population issues. Although critical to the overall success
of a public health response, in-depth discussion of these issues
is beyond the scope of this article.
Public Health Response Box 2: Day 4
Laurence Livermore is a 53-year-oldmanwhowas walking his dog
when amassive explosion occurred behind him in the city’s down-
town area. He hurried home, but just before arriving there, he no-
ticedparticulatedebris fallingonhim.Hewent insidehishouse, and
shortlythereafter, thewarningsirensbegantosound.Althoughsome
televisionstationswerenotbroadcasting,otherstationscarriedwarn-
ings thatpeople shouldmoveto the interiorofbuildingsandstay in-
side. Laurence sheltered in place as instructed.About 4 hours later,
hewas instructed via television to remove and baghis clothing and
showerwith soapandwater.The followingmorning, televisionand
reverse 911 telephone calls instructed people living in specific ZIP
codes to pack an overnight bag and report to 1 of several screening
sites (opened at preidentified public health mass dispensing sites).
Despite some nausea and vomiting, Laurence reported to the site,
where he was asked several questions about his exposure, location
during the fallout, and physical symptoms. He was sheltered over-
night in a church. With his vomiting improved, he returned for
reassessment to the screening site as directed. Because his ARS
symptoms did not seem to indicate a poor prognosis, he received a
wristband qualifying him for a daily dose of G-CSF adjacent to the
screening area.Hewas counseled about his risks and it was strongly
recommended to him that he be evacuated to another metropoli-
tanarea forobservationand furthercare.Heagreed, and2days later
Laurencewasbusedtotheairportwasandthenflowntoanothercity.
Hecompletedademographicandhealthquestionnaireenroute.Upon
arrival, thepassengerswerebused toan intake location,where their
formswere reviewedbythe localpublichealthagencyandtheywere
referred either to hospitals or a local hotel for observation and con-
tinuedtreatment.Bloodtestsweretakenat thehotelanddaily symp-
tomchecksandmedicationadministrationclinicsweremadeavail-
able in a hotel conference room.
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Medical System Response
Hospitals throughout the region will implement surge capac-
ity plans51,52 and may have to adjust their standard of care to a
situational standard of crisis medical care.1,13,53-55 Triage deci-
sions will be necessary to optimize saving lives and providing
palliative care to the extent possible (discussed further else-
where in this special issue by DiCarlo et al,2 Caro et al,56 Casa-
grande et al,31 and Coleman et al32).
The heterogeneous situation across local and regional health
care systems has been described by Knebel et al1 and DiCarlo
et al.2 The importance of fairness to victims, albeit in a crisis
standards of care mode, is enhanced by regional preparation to
harmonize crisis standards of care and triage policy through in-
tegrated information and resource sharing among health care
institutions. Communications may be severely compromised
bothwithin and between facilities and disciplines after a nuclear
incident, requiring redundant communications planning.57
Regional Coordination of Medical Resources
Establishment of Health and Medical Coordination Centers
(HMCCs)will facilitate the ability ofmultiple health care facili-
ties in the area to quickly gather incident information and logis-
tical needs, and to act in coordination with public health, EMS,
andemergencymanagement.Highlyeffective implementationof
HMCCshasoccurredinmajorhurricanesthatrequiredmassevacu-
ations of civilians and hospitalized patients.17,58 The formation of
these centers has been described in several articles and texts.53,59
The formation of hospital coalitions, which define the ability of
healthcare facilities toprovidemutualassistance, exchange infor-
mation, distribute resources, and function as an interface/
clearinghouse for the regional hospitals, is now a requirement of
the DHHS hospital preparedness grant program.5,60,61
Private and government- (eg, Department of Veterans Affairs)
owned health care systems often have disaster plans that obtain
support for their systemhospitals from other facilities outside the
affected area.Asdemandexceeds resources, a tiered systemof step-
wisemobilizationof resourceswill be involved so that the resource–
demandmismatch is corrected as quickly as possible, usuallywith
a combination of resource supply and patient evacuation. This
system is well described by Barbera andMacintyre in theMedical






jurisdictional boundaries, or in a single jurisdictionmaybepart of
the emergency operations center. An effective interface will act
as a clearinghouse for information, resource requests, transfer re-
quests, and transportation assetsmatching so that there is coordi-
nationacross thedisciplines, as competingpriorities forbuildings,
transportation, medications, staff, law enforcement support, and
other assets is ensured (eg, a convention centermay be desired by
emergencymanagement for shelter, by public health as a screen-
ing site/assemblycenter, andbyhospitals asanalternatecare site).
Theseconstructsarebestpracticedpreincident,usingmultiagency
coordinationsystemprinciples.69Notably,mostof theseconstructs
are referred to as coordination rather than command centers be-
causetheymaycross jurisdictionsandincludeprivateEMSandhos-
pitalpartners thatarevoluntaryparticipants intheprocessandnot
commanded by an agency or jurisdiction.
Coordination between theHMCCand local, state, and regional
emergency operations centers will facilitate requesting and re-
ceivingassistance; coordinatingavailablebeds, resources, and trans-
portation; and reducing confusion. Incident management teams
from outside the affected area may be deployed and used to great
utility to coordinate the process of incidentmanagement.70 Tech-
nologies such asWeb-based information sharing systems and con-
ference calls also can be invaluable tools.
In this scarce-resources setting theHMCCcandeveloputilization
policy in conjunction with state and technical experts (eg, issu-
ing real-timeguidance foruseofmyeloidcytokines).TheHMCC
canalsoworkcloselywithpublichealthauthorities toensurecon-
sistency of public messages regarding these allocation decisions.
Medical System Response Box 1: Key Principles
for Medical System Response to a Nuclear Detonation
• Situational awareness is likely to be limited in the first few
days.
• Preexistingregionalcoalitionsandmanagement/coordinationcon-
structs should be used to optimize use of available health care re-
sourcesand toobtainmore rapid situational awareness.Coalitions
must have redundant plans for command and control in case the
usual coordination points or personnel are unavailable.
• Systemsmust be in place to assess, coordinate, and deploy new as-
setsastheyarriveonscene(federalandstategovernments,surround-




pitals to optimize use of their limited resources andmanage arriv-
ing external support.
• Public communication, both basic information and risk commu-
nication, should be used to reduce unnecessary demands on the
medical system. This should be coordinated with federal govern-
ment messaging.
• Medical coordination shoulddiffuse themedical impactbyevacu-
atingpatients toother areasof the regionandnation thathavead-
equate capacity. Initial focus on rapid transfer of nonambulatory
traumacasualtiesmayrequiremodificationbasedonresourceavail-
ability.
• Specific attention must be paid to the availability of pediatric re-
sources in the region and beyond to optimize the survival of chil-
dren who have been injured, burned, or exposed to radiation.
• Falloutcasualtiesmayneedearly interventiontomitigateARS,al-
though they may not appear to be seriously ill.
• Medical support at assemblycenters andalternatecare siteswill be
needed, and the health care system will be called on to assist in/
coordinate these efforts.
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Surroundingstatesandregionsalsowillbeaffectedandmaybeforced
toactivatetheirowncoordinationsystems. Indeed, receivingcom-
munitiesmayhave to implement selective resource triage (eg,na-




progresswill require substantial personnel andmaterial resources.
Qualified staffmay be in severe shortage in the early aftermath of
a nuclear detonation incident due to issues relative to the ability
toaccess thehealthcare facility, impactof the incidenton family,
and the very real possibility that a segment of health careworkers
will decide not to report for work because of concerns about the
riskof sufferingpersonalhealtheffects.71,72Unfortunately,willing-
ness to report toworkafter a radiation incident is particularly low:
Only 49% of nurses surveyed by Lanzilotti et al would report for
duty.73 Interestingly, personnel with the least training or knowl-
edge for these special response situations also had the least desire
foradditionaltraining.Thishassignificantimplicationsforourabil-
ity to increasewillingness torespondbybuildingexpertise through
education.74 Preincident educationwith an emphasis on risk per-
ceptionvsactualrisk is likelystill thebestmethodtoimprovework-
force response. Just-in-timeeducational efforts alsowill be impor-
tant to combat rumors and address conflicting information, thus
allowinghealth care personnel tomake informeddecisions about
their personal risks.
Finally, because of the specialized needs of severely injured or
radiation-exposedchildren,regionaldisastermedicalresponseplan-
ners and relevant national organizations (eg, theNational Asso-
ciation of Children’s Hospitals and Related Institutions) should
considerwhere andhowchildrenwill be transported to appropri-
ate facilities under the circumstances of a large-scale disasterwith
many pediatric victims.
Evacuee Medical Care and Fallout-Related
Radiation Illness
The medical management of ARS is discussed by DiCarlo
and coauthors.2 The Radiation Injury Treatment Network
(RITN)75 serves as a technical and operational resource
after radiation injury incidents. Although it is likely that
Medical System Response Box 2: Day 5
Millie Gray, the coordinator leading the Emergency Support Function #8 “Public Health and Medical Services” regional response, has just
briefed the county emergency manager, key local elected officials, state health department liaison, and public health director on the situa-
tion 5 days after the detonation. One of the 30 hospitals was in the severe damage zone and was destroyed as a result of the blast. Most of the
staff, visitors, and patients remain unaccounted for. Two additional hospitals had substantial window damage and undertook a phased evacu-
ation of their facilities after providing initial care to self-referred patients. Patients who could be easily evacuated to on-campus collection
sites were moved. Seriously ill adults and the children awaiting skilled medical evacuation were cared for in units with makeshift window
coverings. EMS units were transporting acutely injured victims to functioning hospitals, so many less seriously injured were evacuated by
buses and other vehicles to regional hospitals within the same network. Critically ill patients required substantially more transport capabil-
ity. Nongovernment rotor-wing assets were used to move unstable patients, including those from a large neonatal and pediatric intensive
care unit. The evacuation of these patients took nearly 2 days. As ambulances from distant regions arrived, provided by the federal ambu-
lance contract, they were used to transport seriously ill adults. The evacuation of the 2 hospitals was completed on day 4.
Many other hospitals, especially the 6 closest to the blast site (not including the 3 that were damaged) have been inundated with severe traumatic
injuries. Centers that do not usually receive trauma patients had to manage many such patients, who arrived by all imaginable modes of transpor-
tation. These patients could not be redistributed easily to other hospitals. There had been confusion about timing surgical procedures for patients
with suspected radiation exposure. Volunteers from a local college were used to assist with epidemiologic data collection to estimate the radiation
exposure for each traumavictimuntil a biodosimetry protocolwas implemented.Cytokine assets beganarriving from theStrategicNational Stock-
pile on day 1, and although there was confusion initially about who should receive them and how they should be distributed, public health, hos-
pitals, and emergency management were able to figure out a system and provide more consistent guidance by day 3.
Many staff were killed, injured, or mourning lost friends and family; others could not come to work because of family obligations. Despite
heroic efforts, caregiving in the first days was chaotic and limited by the availability of staff and medical resources. By day 5, hospital func-
tions were becoming more stable, with federalized medical personnel providing relief.
The regional health andmedical coordination center (HMCC)was established on day 1, and situational awareness of health system function was
extremely limited at that time. Because local hospitals were already inundated with seriously ill and injured people, alternate sites were needed to
screen patients for significant radiation exposure and to provideminor care. Furthermore, a number of people with complex chronicmedical con-
ditionswhowere living in the communitywere arriving at hospitals seeking oxygen, dialysis, and other assistance.Alternate care siteswere opened
in conjunctionwith public health authorities at preselected sites that did not conflictwith screening sites. The alternate care facilitieswere located
in the same buildings as screening, to optimize the use of personnel for administrative, logistics, and security functions. The coordination center
developedpatient lists for theNationalDisasterMedical System(NDMS)andcoordinatedwithEMStransport to the airport.Byday5, federal staff
were providing care at the alternate care facilities, whichquickly filledwith peoplewith complex care needswhohadno caregiver or safe sheltering
options.Additional federalmedical stationswere in theprocess of being set up toprovidebetter and safer special needs shelters. Six of these 250bed
units were expected to be operational in preidentified facilities within the next 48 hours.A federal incidentmanagement teamhad arrived to assist
in health and medical planning and logistics at the HMCC.
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preference would be given to utilizing member hospitals of the
NDMS76 and RITN facilities, the magnitude of a nuclear deto-
nation incident is such that all of the facilities in the surround-
ing region and most tertiary care facilities in the nation may re-
ceive patients, either by formal referral or self-referral. Thus, a
community plan to receive and treat such patients should be ac-
counted for at all major health care facilities. The RITN net-
work health care facility guidance and communication and co-
ordination planmay be a resource to other facilities planning for
these victims.3,75 NDMS, RITN, and nonparticipating facilities
capable of treating pediatric ARS must be preidentified.
Most victims with the hematologic subsyndrome of ARS will
be ambulatory and feel reasonably well for the 1- to 2-week la-
tent period; therefore routine forms of transportation can be
used to reach referral sites throughout the nation.77 Most will
need medical monitoring but not hospitalization.
Although the number of people exposed to radiation may be
large, a decreasing number will require cytokines, outpatient
care, inpatient care, and stem cell transplant (Figure 2). De-
spite the proportional decrease, the numbers of people requir-
ing treatment with cytokines, platelets, and other support may
greatly exceed national availability, requiring state, federal, and
discipline-specific (eg, American Association of Blood Banks,
American Red Cross) guidance on conservation and alloca-
tion of such resources.
Jurisdictions should plan in coordination with public health,
emergency management, and the medical community so that
there is a shared understanding of the responsibilities for these
evacuees. Becausemost of the patients will need ongoingmoni-
toring but not hospitalization, plans for accommodations (ho-
tels, special needs shelters), outpatient medical care andmoni-
toring, referral for inpatient treatment, and patient tracking and
family information and reunification are core elements of such
planning. Coordinationmechanisms among health care facili-
ties and the local jurisdictions, states, and federal agencies will
be required to fairly address multiple and competing resource
needs and shortfalls, and address issues in what will certainly
be a dynamic response environment inwhichmany policies and
procedures will be developed de novo.
Recovery
The Scarce Resources for aNuclear Detonation Project did not
formally address issues of recovery, but some key objectives are
included in the present article because recovery planning must
begin during the response phase.
A nuclear detonation will have unpredictable military and
economic consequences that create hardships for the entire
nation. A new pool of citizens will be created that will
require lifelong monitoring and specialized care. Many will
experience at least transient behavioral health effects that
may compromise resilience and increase the support
required. (Psychological issues are discussed further by Dod-
gen et al.33) Significant public and social program support for
displaced and injured people is the joint responsibility of
local, state, regional, and tribal governments along with the
federal government.
After the initial response phase, it is likely that victims and pro-
viders will experience a fatigue and disillusionment phase dur-
ing which victims will feel abandoned and providers bur-
Evacuee Medical Care and Fallout-Related Radiation
Illness Box 1: Key Principles in Care of Fallout-Related
Radiation Illness
• Patient tracking and family reunification will be key objec-
tives.
• Major population centers, cancer center/bone marrow trans-
plant units and cancer centers (Radiation Injury Treatment
Network [RITN]) may receive large numbers of fallout-
injured patients.
• Early assessment of ALC or other biodosimetry assays can
help predict prognosis and need for treatment.
• Prioritization for cytokine (eg, G-CSF) treatment will be
necessary.2
• The majority of evacuated patients will not require hospital-
ization.
• Receiving communities will need an integrated approach to
the receipt, in-processing, surveillance, housing, and medical
care of these specialized patients.
• Protocols for the diagnosis, transport, and treatment of chil-
dren with ARS should be planned well before an actual
nuclear detonation.
RecoveryBox1:KeyPrinciplesDuring theRecoveryPhase
• Medicalmonitoring and carewill be ongoing and, in somecases,
complex.
• Social and behavioral health issues will become dominant after
the initial acute medical care period and will require multidis-
ciplinary approaches.
• Family reunification systemswill need tobeactivatedandaggres-
sively implemented.
• Continuity of access to health care and essential social systems
will be essential to meet victim needs.
• A rapid return to a state of normalcywith respect to appropriate
permanent housing, schooling, community services, and other
essential systems will be essential to reduce the long-term psy-
chological impact on children and families.
• A significant portion of the evacuees will be permanently dis-
placed, posing significant problems with the continuity of their
complex medical and social care.
• Ongoing risk communication is critical to provide accurate in-
formation, dispel rumors, andprovide assessmentof delayed risks
from radiation.
• Long-termmonitoring should be done for those deemed to be at
risk for late radiation-induced damage or cancer. Who requires
monitoring will require expert input from epidemiologists.
• Long-term follow-upand registrieswill beneeded forotherphysi-
cal injuries and psychiatric support.
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dened, and psychologicalmanifestations of the trauma continue
to evolve.78-80 During this phase, long-termmanagement of burn,
trauma, and radiation-related injuries will continue, with on-
going stress on hematology, burn, and rehabilitation centers.
Monitoring and treatment for delayed effects of acute radia-
tion exposure40,81 will be initiated. Problems identifying and
tracking victims will likely lead to continuity of surveillance
and care issues as victimsmove closer to family, friends, or jobs.
Victims are likely to receive inaccurate information regarding
treatments, alternative treatments, and risk from a variety of
sources. Well-meaning health professionals may create confu-
FIGURE 2
Distribution of care requirements for fallout-exposed patients evacuated to other areas
Risk stratification and surveillance only
Outpatient treatment for
infection and other complications
Inpatient treatment for







Medical System Response Box 2: Day 14
Marie Curie is the lead nurse on the hematopoietic stem cell transplant unit at an academic medical center in the San Francisco, CA,
area. She had not been able to contact her husband’s cousin, who lived about 10 mi from ground zero, and was sleepless and frequently
tearful.
Twodays after thedetonation, herhospitalwas asked toprepare for 100 to200victimsduring thenext 7 to10days.Thehospital’s command system
was immediately activated.Adequate spacewas being planned to accommodate the victims, including canceling elective cases and identifying pa-
tients for transfer to other facilities or discharge during thenext several days. Specific supplies includingG-CSF, antibiotics, and burnwounddress-
ings had been stockpiled from local vendors and pharmacies. Oncology nurses immediately organized training for practitioners who did not have
prior experience with these complex patients.
Victims began arriving 4 days after the detonation. Commercial airliners provided ambulatory patient transport of fallout casualties whose ex-
posure and symptoms were consistent with moderate (2-6 Gy) exposure and who were now in the latent phase of their illness. Some had re-
ceived G-CSF and lymphocyte counts, whereas others had not. More than 100 patients arrived on each plane, accompanied by a few medical
practitioners. The initial patients appeared to be relatively well, although they were fatigued and some had vomiting and diarrhea on the flight.
By day 10, more severely injured radiation victims, including patients who had undergone surgery at other centers, were arriving via military air-
craft.During thenext fewweeks,manyof the initial patients became severelyneutropenic and required extensive supportive care, includingbroad-
spectrumantibiotics, transfusions, and intravenous fluids.During this time,Marieattendedadailymeeting to reviewissues related to scarce resources,
brainstorm for solutions, and develop or modify plans for resource allocation.
One ofMarie’s patients, Laurence Livermore, was transferred to San Francisco via commercial airliner 4 days after the detonation.He arrivedwith
few records, but according to him, he receivedG-CSF on 2 of the first 4 days. His vomiting and cutaneous erythema improved after 2 days, but he
developed watery, profuse diarrhea. On arrival, his absolute neutrophil count was 0 and it remained low despite daily G-CSF. He was hospitalized
for antibiotics and supportive care.His sister, who lives in Iowa,was contacted andher bloodwas drawn for human leukocyte antigen typing. Based
onbuccal swabDNA, unrelated donors through theNationalMarrowDonor Programwere being sought. Fortunately,MrLivermore’smost recent
absolute neutrophil count had increased to 0.2.
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sion if they do not have adequate information about the risk of
cancer, genetic, and noncancer effects postexposure. Thus, a
priority in the recovery phase is on the development of and cir-
culation to victims and providers of accurate information about
treatment, long-term risk, and outcomes of their injury or in-
juries. Rumor control and specific official information address-
ing inappropriate or unhelpful treatments is mandatory to pre-
vent victim and provider confusion.
Manyvictimswill have extraordinary social andbehavioral health
support requirements. Childrenwill be particularly vulnerable to
severe and long-term mental health and behavioral conse-
quences. In addition, their families, providers, and the commu-
nity at large will experience long-term psychological effects. Pa-
tients with preexisting psychiatric illness will be extremely
destabilized by the incident andwill have increased care require-
ments. Displacement and behavioral health issues are not rap-
idly resolved. Six years afterHurricaneKatrina, two-thirds of dis-
placed children exhibit emotional or behavioral problems andhalf
remain in temporary housing.82 The National Child Traumatic
Stress Network83 can coordinate best-practices assistance in the
recoveryphase to support uniquepediatric behavioralhealthneeds
after a disaster. A new office of the Assistant Secretary for Pre-
paredness and Response, the Office for At-Risk Individuals, Be-
havioral Health, and Human Services Coordination, has been
TABLE
Example of Response During the First Few Days

















Assess facility for damage/maintain
operations
Triage, treatment of victims of
trauma/combined injury
Begin G-CSF treatment as appropriate, if
available
Issue warnings and information
Disaster declarations initiated
Shelters opened
2 Increased search and
rescue of wounded
















Reassess and reprioritize patients based
on evolving evidence of combined
injury, obtain lymphocyte counts
Determine patients for
evacuation/forward movement via
NDMS or local assets (limited
evacuation may occur during this time)
Patients presenting with acute radiation
illness from fallout and continued
minor trauma from initial blast require
treatment/referral
Joint public information center
Coordination with state/federal entities
Process resource requests and resulting
logistics
Refine event modeling with federal
assistance
Mass fatality management: for immediate














Begin to evacuate fallout
casualties (as they enter




Begin patient evacuation to centers with
capacity
Prepare to and begin integrating external
staff and resources as
applicable/needed
Complete surgeries if possible on
combined injury patients
Continued high volumes of patients with
radiation injury
Integrate arriving resources
Determine plans for ongoing sheltering
and evacuation of injured and
noninjured
Continue to process resource requests
A-Team=Federal Radiologic Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health; EM=emergency management; EMS=emergency medical services; FRMAC=Federal Radiological
Monitoring and Assessment Center; G-CSF=granulocyte colony-stimulating factor; NDMS=National Disaster Management System; RITN=Radiation Injury Treatment Network;
SNS=Strategic National Stockpile.
Recovery Box 2: Day 122
Clara Barton is a social worker at the Iowa City Veterans Affairs
Medical Center and works at the clinic designated for long-term
follow-up of people affected by thenuclear detonation.Today is the
4-month anniversary of the detonation, which has been particu-
larly emotional for everyone. The clinic’s nuclear response team is
a multispecialty group that includes medical practitioners, mental
health professionals, physical and occupational therapists, and data
collectionmanagers.The socialwork–relatedneeds for patientshave
been extensive. Many patients are not from Iowa City and require
helpwith temporary housing, financial support, reconnectingwith
loved ones, job placement, and transportation. A federal govern-
ment tracking system studies the outcomes and provides support for
victims, but it involves a significant amount of paperwork.
OneofClara’s patients, LaurenceLivermore,moved fromSanFran-
cisco, where he was hospitalized for 6 weeks, to Iowa City so that
he could be closer to his sister. He lives in survivor housing in a
university dormitory.Mr Livermore comes to the clinicweekly and
is seen by a nurse practitioner, psychologist, and social worker. His
CD4count remainsunder200, buthis otherbloodcounts andchem-
istries have normalized. He says he continues to feel “sad and anx-
ious” and voices feelings of guilt about being prioritized for treat-
ment while others were “left to die.”He has difficulty sleeping and
concentrating and does not feel capable of going back to work.He
continues to be guilt ridden about leaving his dog at the assembly
center, and has not been able to find him despite many attempts.
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formed to attempt to bring consistency and integration to plan-
ning and response for these populations.83 The degree of disrup-
tion, displacement, and damage posed by a nuclear detonation
radically complicates efforts to return the victims to asmuchnor-
malcy as possible, yet this must continue to be the overarching
goal of recovery.
Within the first few years after the incident, myelodysplastic
syndromes may develop, with radiation-induced solid tumors
occurring many years or decades later, in a subset of exposed
people. In fact, any adverse medical event in the population
exposed to1 or 2 Gy will become an issue.
The recovery phase of a nuclear incident is exceptionally pro-
longed in relation to other catastrophic incidents that do not
require lifetime surveillance and ongoing care. No other disas-
ter will affect the lives of the victims, their families, and pro-
viders as profoundly.
Integration of Actions Across Health Care Sectors
The Table is an example of the key components of the re-
sponse and how they fit together.
CONCLUSIONS
Anuclear detonationpresents challenges of unprecedented scale.
As massive as it is, an effective medical response can save lives
and provide comfort on an unprecedented scale. Preplanning
enables proper decisionmaking, effective communication,main-
tenance of a command/coordination structure, optimal re-
source management despite initial scarcity, and thoughtful ap-
plication of medical triage guidance.
This article has outlined key considerations for the overall health
care system that support the decision points detailed in the state
and local planners playbook.3 The authors believe that this ar-
ticle will facilitate and stimulate additional planning and edu-
cation that would bring us as close as possible to preparedness
for what once was an impossible incident, but one for which
an effective response, including community and national medi-
cal system resilience, would provide benefit to millions.
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